23. 2. Zahájení semináře + testování teorií I
(1) Harry M. Collins – Trevor J. Pinch, “Two Experiments that Proved the Theory of Relativity” in The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, s. 27-55. Prosíme o nastudování zejm. 2. části této kapitoly, jež je věnována Eddingtonovu experimentu (v našem elektronickém vydání knihy na s. 55-67).
(2) Carl Gustav Hempel (1966), "Crucial Tests" in The Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall, 1966, s. 25-28. 9. 3. Testování teorií II
(1) Trevor Pinch, “Theory Testing in Science. The Case of Solar Neutrinos: Do Crucial Experiments Test Theories or Theorists?“, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 15, 1985, s. 167-187.
(2) Imre Lakatos, “Introduction: Science and Pseudoscience” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. I: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. (J. Worrall – G. Currie, eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, s. 1-7. 23. 3. Replikace experimentů I
(1) Collins, H. M., "Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a Physical Phenomenon." Social Studies of Science 11, no. 1, 1981: 33-62.
(2) Radder, Hans, “Experimental Reproductibility and the Experimenters’ Regress.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1992: 63-73. 6. 4. Replikace experimentů II
(1) Mulkay, Michael. “The Scientist Talks Back: A One-Act Play, with a Moral, about Replication in Science and Reflexivity in Sociology.” Social Studies of Science 14, no. 2, 1984: 265–83.
(2) Hacking, Ian, "Experimentation and scientific realism", in Representing and Intervening, 1983: 252-267.
(3) Franklin, A. and Howson, C. “Why Do Scientists Prefer to Vary Their Experiments,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 15 (1984), 51-62. 20. 4. Vědecké kontroverze/vytváření konsensu I
(1) Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, chapter II: "Seeing and Believing: The Experimental Production of Pneumatic Facts", Princeton University Press, Princeton 1985, pp. 22-79.
(2) Hacking, Ian, "Experimentation and scientific realism", in Representing and Intervening, 1983: 252-267. 4. 5. Vědecké kontroverze/vytváření konsensu II
(1) M. Heidelberger, „Theory-Ladenness and Scientific Instruments in Experimentation.“ In H. Radder (Ed.), The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003, str. 138-151.
(2) Knorr-Cetina, Karin. „How Superorganisms Change: Consensus Formation and the Social Ontology of High-Energy Physics Experiments“ Social Studies of Science 25, no. 1 (1995), str. 119-47. 18. 5. Konstrukce a dekonstrukce kvarků I
(1. 6. Pro ty, kdo nebudou mít dost I: Konstrukce a dekonstrukce kvarků II)
(15. 6. Pro ty, kdo nebudou mít dost II: Fyzici čtou STS) 5. - 7. 7. Setkání s prof. Harry Collins
Reputed as neglected for a long time, the sociology of science and scientific knowledge constitutes nowadays one of the most prominent sociological sub-disciplines. Its mode of inquiry goes far beyond the investigations of its particular object for it also intervenes into general sociology whose very foundations it discusses and transforms.
Although we commonly situate the spectacular development of the sociology of science in the 1970s and 1980s, there is little doubt that “science” wasn’t absent from sociological reflections long before these decades. Within the long run of its sociological appropriation, the research object “science” underwent nonetheless substantial transformations that have also impacted on sociology’s relation to philosophy that has traditionally grounded its expertise in dealing with the question of human knowledge, and stressed such proficiency as one of its pivotal epistemic assets.
In our study of several representative episodes of sociological inquiring into physics, we will pay special attention to this changing relation between sociology and philosophy of science, and give voice to both of these disciplines in order to better seize their respective commitments and collaborative potentials.