We shall examine contemporary attempts to define and explain the phenomenon of consciousness. The central question will be how consciousness can be accounted for in a naturalistic way: whether, for example, it can be understood as a state of the brain, or as reducible to "functional states", or as a "user-illusion" or other form of illusion. We will pay attention to the mysterians who think that a naturalist explanation, though in principle possible, is humanly unattainable. We will also consider emergentist theory and the recent revival of panpsychism and neutral monism which, though they reject physicalism, remain naturalistic theories. Throughout the course we will bear in mind the different conceptions of consciousness that are presupposed by the philosophers whom we discuss. Plan of course:
1. Introduction: consciousness and the hard problem
2. Identity theory
3. Functionalism and multiple realizability
4. Illusionism
5. Non-reductive biological theory
6. Mysterianism
7. Emergentism
8. Panpsychism
9. Neutral monism
10. Conclusion