Syllabus
* Week 1 - Problem of Moral Responsibility and Free Will Seminar Reading: Wolf, S. (1990) ‘The Dilemma of Autonomy’, Chapter 1 in her Freedom Within Reason, Oxford University Press. Further Recommended Readings: Strawson, G. (1994) ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1/2). * Week 2 - Compatibilism and the Problem of Determinism Seminar Reading: Ayer, A.
J. (1954) ‘Freedom and Necessity’, Philosophical Essays, Greenwood Press. Also in Watson, G. (1982) Free Will, Oxford University Press. Further Recommended Readings: Hobart, R.
E. (1934) ‘Free will as Requiring Determination and Inconceivable Without it’, Mind 43 (169). Van Inwagen, P. (1975) ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, Philosophical Studies 27 (3). * Week 3 - Compatibilism and the Problem of Alternative Possibilities Seminar Reading: Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) ‘Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66.
Further Recommended Readings: Fisher, J. M. (2010) ‘The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories’, The Philosophical Review 119. * Week 4 - Responses to Source Incompatibilism Seminar Reading: Frankfurt, H.
G. (1971) ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of the Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1). Further Recommended Readings: Wolf, S. (1990) ‘The Real Self View’, Chapter 2 in her Freedom Within Reason. Watson, G. (2004) ‘The Two Faces of Responsibility’ Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays, Oxford University Press. * Week 5 - Free Will and Manipulation Seminar Reading: Pereboom, D. (1995) ‘Determinism al dente’, Nous 29(1). Further Recommended Readings: McKenna, M. (2008) ‘A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1). Beforsky, B. (2006) ‘Global Control and Freedom’, Philosophical Studies 131(2).
Kane, R. (1998) ‘Ultimate Responsibility’, The Significance of Free Will, Oxford University Press. * Week 6 - Event-Causal Libertarianism Seminar Reading: Kane, R. (2002) ‘Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth’, in Kane, R. The Oxford Handbook on Free Will, Oxford University Press. Further Recommended Readings: Watson, G. (1999) Hard Compatibilism and Soft Libertarianism’, Journal of Ethics 3(4). Almeida, B. and Bernstein, M. (2003) ‘Lucky Libertarianism’, Philosophical Studies 22(2). * Week 7 - Agent-Causal Libertarianism Seminar Reading: Steward, H. (2009) ‘The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism’, Philosophical Explorations 12(2). Further Recommended Readings: Pereboom, D. (2004) ‘Is Our Conception of Agent Causation Coherent?’, Philosophical Topics 32. O’Connor, T. (2011) ‘Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom’, in Kane R.
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press. * Week 8 - Moral Luck Seminar reading: Nagel, T. (1979) ‘Moral Luck’, Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press. Further Recommended Readings: Williams, B. (1981) ‘Moral Luck’, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press. Wolf, S. (2001) ‘The Moral of the Moral Luck’, Philosophical Exchange 31(1).
Enoch, D. and Marmor, A. (2007) ‘The Case Against Moral Luck’, Law and Philosophy 26(4). * Week 9 - Responsibility and Moral Ignorance Seminar Reading: Gideon, R. (2002) ‘Culpability and Ignorance’, Proceeding of Aristotelian Society 103(3). Further Recommended Readings: Fricker, M. (2010) ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance’, Aristotelian Supplementary Volume 84(1). Moody Adams, M. (1994) ‘Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance’, Ethics 104(2). * Week 10 - Collective Responsibility Seminar Reading: List, C. and Pettit, P. (2011) ‘Holding Group Agents Responsible Further Recommended Readings: Gilber, M. (2006) ‘Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30(1). * Week 11 - Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Personal Implications Part I Seminar Reading: Strawson, P., F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy 48. Further Recommended Readings: Bennet, J. (2008) ‘Accountability (II), in McKenna M. and Russell P.
Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Ashgate Publishing. * Week 12 - Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Personal Implications Part II Seminar Reading: Pereboom, D. (2009) ‘Free Will, Love and Anger’, Ideas Y Valores 58(141).
Further Recommended Readings: Watson, G. (2004) ‘Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme’, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays, Oxford University Press. * Week 13 - Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Political Implications Seminar Reading: Pereboom, D. (2013) ‘Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment’, in Nadelhoffer, T. A.
The Future of Punishment’, Oxford University Press. Further Recommended Readings: Levy, N. (2012) Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility’, Law and Philosophy 31(5). Smilansky, S. (2011) ‘Hard Determinism and Punishment a Practical Reductio’, Law and Philosophy 30(3).
Caruso, G. D. (Forthcoming) ‘The Public Health Quarantine Model’, in Nelkin, D. and Pereboom, D.
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press.
Annotation
The existence of free will is one of the most discussed and disagreed topics in the history of philosophy and the controversy persists. We are shaped by various forces beyond our control: physical laws, genes, nurture, culture.
Do these forces still leave a room for free will? And if so, what kind? Is such a free will enough to justify praising and blaming, rewarding and punishing, hating and loving, being resentful or grateful? The purpose of this seminar is to critically examine some of the important contemporary positions in regards to the ontological status of free will and its implications to these questions.
The course will be held in English and is suitable for Bachelor as well as Master students in Philosophy. Non- specialists are also welcome; however, due to some of the philosophical terminology used, it is advised to get in touch with the instructor to discuss the suitability of the course for non-specialists in advance.
Aim of the course:
The course does not aim to advance a certain position in the free will debate. Rather, it is structured to acquaint the participants with some of the most important debates and positions in the contemporary free will debate and to point out the limitations and weaknesses of held positions or given arguments. By doing so, it enables the participants of this course to make their own informed opinion on the issue. Students will be guided on how to interpret sources, identify held positions, assess their significance in the current debate, and learn how to critically evaluate identified arguments and positions.