Introduction to Existential Phenomenology

Syllabus

M. Heidegger (lectures 1-3)1. Being-there. Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology.

Reference texts: i. Being and Time, §§1-6 ii. T. Carman "What is Fundamental Ontology?" 2. Being-with-Others and Being Lost in Others.

Reference texts:  i. Being and Time, §§25-27 (secondary text: H. Dreyfus: ii. H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, Chapter 8, The Who of Everyday Dasein 3. Winning Oneself Back through Being-Toward-Death.

Reference texts: i. Being and Time, §§ 40, 53 ii. T. Carman, Things fall apart: Heidegger on the Constancy and Finality of Death

J.-P. Sartre (lectures 4-6) 4. Phenomena of Being and Being of Phenomena: Sartre’s ontological argument.

Reference texts: i. J. P. Sartre, Transcendence  of ego, pp. 1-12 ii. J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Introduction: chapters 1-5 5. Nothing but Consciousness: a Basic Sketch of Being-for-itself.

Reference texts: i. Being and Nothingness, part 1, chapter 1 ii. P. Spade, Lectures on Sartre, pp. 80-93 6. Encountering Others

Reference texts: i.  J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, chapter 3.1.4, Look ii. J.-P. Sartre, No Exit

M. Merleau-Ponty (lectures 7-9) 7. “Consciousness as a Project of the World:” Merleau-Ponty’s Turn to the Pre-Reflective World

Reference texts: i.  M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Foreword ii. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Phenomenal Field 8.  Body as Existential Core of Being-in-the-World: Schneider’s Case

Reference texts: i. Phenomenology of Perception, The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility, pp. 112-145 ii. H. Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science 9.  Anonymity and Sharedness: Merleau-Pontian Account of Others

Reference texts: i. Phenomenology of Perception, Other Selves and the Human World, pp. 403-425 ii. LAU Kwok-ying, Intersubjectivity and Phenomenology of the Other: Merleau-Ponty’s Contribution

Perspectives of Existential Phenomenology (lectures 10-11)  10. Perspectives of Existential Phenomenology I: Pragmatic Readings

Reference texts: i. M.  Wrathall, Making Sense of Human Existence: Heidegger on the Limits of Practical Familiarity 11. Perspectives of Existential Phenomenology II: Neuroscience.

Reference texts: i. A. Noë, Out of Our Heads, The Paradox of Mind and Science, p. 42-46; Wide Minds, pp. 61-82  

Annotation

Description and Goals:

In this course, we will read and discuss such figures as M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre and M. Merleau-Ponty who are generally considered to be representing the existential “wing” of phenomenology. The course will pursue three main goals: i. First, we will outline the common background of the early approaches of Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty explaining why it is possible to talk about the existential phenomenology in the first place. We will investigate their emphasis on ontology and corresponding existential accounts of selfhood, intersubjectivity and the world. ii. Based on this, we will investigate the specifics of every approach emphasizing their differences and mutual criticisms. In particular, we will examine how Heidegger’s existential analytics of Dasein correlates to Sartre’s philosophy of mind and Merleau-Ponty’s bodily phenomenology. iii. We will also investigate some perspectives that are opened up by the existential approach. This includes pragmatic readings of phenomenology and more recent advances in neuroscience.