Sylabus
I. Fundamentals of Law and Economics. Externalities and the Coase theorem
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 1, 2, 4
Posner, Richard: Economic Analysis of the Law (5th ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers, 1998 pp. 3-31.
Montag, J. and Sobek, T. (2018): Proportionality test, forthcoming in Marciano, A. and Ramello G.B. (Eds.). 2019. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126389
Coase, Ronald H., The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (1960).
Calabresi, G., & Melamed, A. D. (1972). Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral. Harvard law review, 1089-1128.
II. The Economics of Property Rights
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 4, 5
Friedman, David: Defining and Enforcing Rights: Property, Liability, & Spaghetti, in Law’s Order: What Economics Has to do with Law and Why It Matters, 2003, chapter 5.
III. The Economics of Torts-Fundamentals and Liability
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 6, 7
IV. An Economic Theory of Contract I.- Fundamentals, Efficient Breach
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 8, 9
V. An Economic Theory of Contract II.- Asymmetric Information, Risk Allocation
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 8, 9
Akerlof, George A.,The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488.
Ben-Shahar, O., & Schneider, C. E. (2014). More than you wanted to know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure. Princeton University Press, Introduction.
VI. Economics of Crime and Punishment
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 11, 12
Becker, Gary: Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, 1968, pp. 167-217 (March/April).
Brabenec, T., & Montag, J. (2014). Criminals and the Price System: Evidence from Czech Metal Thieves. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1-34.
VII. Economics of Civil and Criminal Procedure
Cooter and Ulen: chapter 10
Garoupa, N. (2012). The economics of prosecutors. Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, 231.
Garoupa, N., & Stephen, F. H. (2008). Why plea-bargaining fails to achieve results in so many criminal justice systems: A new framework for assessment. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 15(3), 323-358.
Dusek, L. and Montag, J. (2019) The effects of simplified criminal procedure: Evidence from one million Czech cases. Working paper, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629116
VIII. Legal Origins, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Shleifer A., R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes (2008). The economic consequences of legal origins, J of Economic Literature.
Djankov S., A. Shleifer, R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes (2003). Courts, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Djankov S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh, A. Shleifer (2008). Debt Enforcement Around the World, J of Political Economy.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. A. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In Philippe Aghion and Stephen N. Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook of economic growth: volume 1A, 2005, (pp. 386–464). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Feld, L.P. & Voigt, S. (2003) Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527.
Anotace
The course
This course is designed to introduce students into a framework of institutions such as formal laws, contracts, and informal norms within which all economic activity takes place. Economic analysis will be applied to illuminate the common law areas such as torts, contracts, property or criminal law. It will examine the effect of legal rules on individual behavior, behavior of firms, consequent resource allocation, income distribution, economic growth. Furthermore, the economic analysis will examine whether these legal rules are in line with reaching socially optimum outcomes. Prior acquaintance with principles of economics is desirable, although brief overview of the relevant economic concepts is given in the introduction.
Student Learning Outcomes
Upon completion of this course, students will be able to:
-understand the key concepts of the economic analysis of law (Coase theorem, incentives, efficient breach etc. )
-learn how legal arrangements enable or impede the functioning of markets
-acquire the skills to assess the role of legal rules in reaching socially efficient outcomes
Important information about the prerequisites: The course requires prior knowledge of economics at the level of an introductory microeconomics course (e.g., Mankiw, G.: Principles of Economics, chapters 1-19). For the Faculty of Law regular master students, this implies that they should have completed the course Theory of national economy I. Throughout the classes and exams, we will presume that the students have the requisite knowledge of this material.