1. 19/2 INTRODUCTORY LECTURE.

Outline of the course and research interests of the students. Calibration to previous knowledge of the students. Is autocracy becoming a “new normal”, or has always been?

2. 26/2 Defining and typologizing autocracies. People within.

The central goal of all autocratic regimes remains the same: to monopolize political power and to preserve it. And people in power want to stay there, usually at all costs. Yet – how do autocracies work from within and who are the key groups ruling them?

Key topics: Typology: what autocracies and what leaders?? Winning Coalition, Selectorate and the others. Patronalism and neo-patrimonialism in particular. System vs. Regime.
Literature:

- de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. (2004) The Logic of Political Survival. Chapter 2. The MIT Press.

At least one of the following:

Isaacs, Rico and Frigerio, Alessandro. Theorizing Central Asian Politics: The State, Ideology and Power. Palgrave, 2019. PAGE
Hanson, S. E. and Kopstein, J. S. (2022) “Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave,” Perspectives on Politics. Cambridge University Press, 20(1), pp. 237–249.
Hale, H. E. (2014) Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Problems of International Politics). Chapters 5 and 11.

Example of good application: Lee, Hanhee. Analyzing the political survival prospects of Kim Jong-un’s North Korean regime through the framework of selectorate theory. Japanese Journal of Political Science (2018), 19, 474–488.

3. 4/3 Transfer of power and subsequent regime consolidation.

As long as autocracies are ruled by mortal people, occasional changes at positions of power are necessary. While in democracies the mechanism and timing are guaranteed and enforced by constitution and courts, in autocracies there are much more diverse ways, stretching from installing a hand-picked successor over collective decision-making to an all-in scramble for power. The winner takes (almost) all; what happens to the losers?

Key topics: transition of office vs. transition of power. Dilemma of hereditary grooming. De-personalization.
Literature:

- Acemoglu, A. & Robinson, J. A. (2001) A theory of political transitions. The American Economic Review, 91(4), 938-963.

At least one of the following:
Anceschi, Luca. After Personalism: Rethinking Power Transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Journal of contemporary Asia, 2021, 51(4), pp.660-680.
Brownlee, Jason. Hereditary succession in modern autocracies. World Politics, Volume 59, Number 4, July 2007, pp. 595-628.
Gillespie, Kate, and Gwenn Okruhlik. “The Political Dimensions of Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 1 (1991): 77–95.
Kendall-Taylor, A., & Frantz, E. (2016). When dictators die. Journal of Democracy, 27(4), 159-171.

4. 11/3 Autocratic solidarity and cooperation

Autocratic rulers by definition do not like independent institutional restraints and do not willingly share their power with other actors. However, usually they have to cooperate or at least coexist in order to keep their economies afloat and their regimes safe. And, if they see fitting, they can even work closely together. What are the main incentives and what are the main obstacles?

Key topics: International institutions and informal clubs. Inter-dependence and cooperation.

Literature:
Tansey, O., Koehler, K., & Schmotz, A. (2017). Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival. Comparative Political Studies, 50(9), 1221-1254
Poujol, Catherine. International Relations in Central Asia: A Focus on Foreign Policies (1991-2020). In: Jeroen Van den Bosch, Adrien Fauve, Bruno De Cordier (eds.) The European Handbook of Central Asian Studies History, Politics, and Societies. EISCAS, ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2021.

Optional:
Allison, Roy, 2018. Protective Integration and Security Policy Coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO. The Chinese journal of international politics, 11(3), pp.297-338.

5. 18/3 How long do autocracies last and how do they collapse?

Some autocracies collapse or transform shortly after their emergence, other manage to outlast generations. The same goes for people: some leaders stay in office for decades, even if their performance is poor, while some fall sooner than even expected. What factors lead to longevity of non-democratic regimes?

Key topics: longevity, durability, resilience. Challenges from within and from the outside.

Literature:

Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. Perspectives on politics, 12(2), 313-331.
Hale, H. E. (2014) Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Problems of International Politics). Chapters 7 and 8.

At least one of the following:
Abel Polese, Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Slavomír Horák (2017) Strategies of legitimation in Central Asia: regime durability in Turkmenistan, Contemporary Politics, 23:4, 427-445.
Gel’man, Vladimir. (2022). The Politics of Bad Governance in Contemporary Russia. Chapters 1-2). University of Michigan Press.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2013). The durability of revolutionary regimes. Journal of Democracy, 24(3), 5-17.

6. 25/3 Follow the money: From resource curse to kleptocracy

How comes states with abundant natural resources appear often have the most severe corruption challenges and inequality of wealth distribution? Why some of them (like Norway) do not? What is the relationship between rent-based economies and autocratic governance? And what role does the western financial institutions play in sustaining and supporting kleptocratic rulers across the world?

Key topics: economics of autocracy. Good and bad governance, kleptocracy, rents.
Literature:

Anceschi, Luca and Schwab, Julia. Facing the Soviet Legacy: Political Economy and Development Patterns in Central Asia. In: Jeroen Van den Bosch, Adrien Fauve, Bruno De Cordier (eds.) The European Handbook of Central Asian Studies History, Politics, and Societies. EISCAS, ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2021.
Sanghera, Balihar and Satybaldieva, Elmira. The Rise of the Rentier Class and Widening Social Inequalities. In: Rentier Capitalism and Its Discontents: Power, Morality and Resistance in Central Asia. Palgrave, 2021.

· Recommended if interested: Bullough, Oliver. Moneyland. 2018.

7. 1/4 Autocracy and repression: domestic and transnational alternative

Repression is frequently linked with non-democratic regimes. However, repression occurs in an entire variety of areas, with different intensity and frequency. Why some regimes react violently to even the the most negligible protest, but others seem as not even caring? And how do autocracies behave outside their borders? How does it corresponds with the regime dynamics? (at the beginning even autocrats could be more “tolerant” towards the protests, while the regime could tightened its attitude towards the “alternatives” as it lasts long.

Key topics: repression, co-optation; regime resilience, domestic and transnational
Literature:

At least two:
Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies.” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (2014): 332–46.
Keremoğlu Eda et al. Thin-skinned leaders: regime legitimation, protest issues, and repression in autocracies. Political Science Research and Methods. 2022;10(1):136-152.
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Economics & politics, 18(1), 1-26.

Optional:
Dukalskis, Alexander et al. Transnational repression: data advances, comparisons, and challenges. Political research Exchange 2022, vol.4, 1-17.

Seminars: [might be updated following the public holidays in Czech republic in 2024] practical application of the discussed theory on empirical examples from non-democratic contexts in late 20^th and 21^st centuries. Students are welcomed to bring cases outside of the Central Asian region. Each student should inform the lecturer about the chosen tittle of the presentation at least 5 working days in advance!

8. 8/4 Seminar: Transfer of power and subsequent regime consolidation.
Presentation:

9. 15/4 Seminar: Autocratic solidarity and cooperation
Presentation:

10. 22/4 Seminar: How long do autocracies last and how do they collapse?
Presentation:

11. 29/4 Seminar: