Day 1 (19 April 2023): Introducing IO blame games
Part 1: How the politicization of IOs drives IO blame games What are IO blame games and why do we see them?	• Louis, M., & Maertens, L. (2021). Why international organizations hate politics. Routledge. Chapter 6. (open access) • Schimmelfennig, F. (2020). Politicisation management in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(3), 342–361. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712458.
Part 2: Varieties of IO blame games Is there a single IO blame game or multiple IO blame games?	• Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B. & Zangl, B. (2023). Varieties of European Blame Games: On Scapegoat, Renegade, and Diffusion Games. In: Dimova, G., Flinders, M., Hinterleitner, M., Rhodes, R. A. W., & Weaver, K. (ed.) The Politics and Governance of Blame. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. • Schlipphak, B., & Treib, O. (2017). Playing the blame game on Brussels: The domestic political effects of EU interventions against democratic backsliding. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3), 352–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229359.
Day 2 (20 April 2023): The players of IO blame games
Part 1: National governments and opposition parties When and how do governments use IOs to avoid blame?	• Novak, S. (2013). The silence of ministers: Consensus and blame avoidance in the council of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1091–1107. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12063 • Traber, D., Schoonvelde, M., & Schumacher, G. (2019). Errors have been made, others will be blamed: Issue engagement and blame shifting in prime minister speeches during the economic crisis in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 59(1), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12340.
Part 2: IO bureaucracies Are IOs passive scapegoats or active blame avoiders?	• Capelos, T., & Wurzer, J. (2009). United Front: Blame Management and Scandal Response Tactics of the United Nations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(2), 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00567.x. • Heinkelmann-Wild, T., & Zangl, B. (2020). Multilevel blame games: Blame-shifting in the European Union. Governance, 33(4), 953–969. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12459.
Day 3 (21 April 2023): The rules and consequences of IO blame games
The rules of the game: Clarity of responsibility and IO authority When do blame generation and blame avoidance strategies succeed or fail? What blame games stick?	• Rittberger, B., Schwarzenbeck, H., & Zangl, B. (2017). Where does the buck stop? Responsibility attributions in complex international institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(4), 909–924. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12524. • Wilson, T.L., & Hobolt, S.B. (2015). Allocating responsibility in multilevel government systems: Voter and expert attributions in the European Union. The Journal of Politics, 77(1), 102–113. https://doi.org/10.1086/678309.
The consequences of IO blame games: Public opinion and accountability Do IO blame games contribute to or inhibit accountability?	• Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B. & Zangl, B. (2023). Blame Shifting and Blame Obfuscation: The Blame Avoidance Effects of Delegation in the EU. European Journal of Political Research, 62(1), 221–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12503. • Hobolt, S.B., & Tilley, J. (2014). Blaming Europe? Responsibility without accountability in the European Union. Oxford University Press. Chapter 8.