The Iranian nuclear program: the security model in the nuclear strategy and the deterrence theory perspective
Abstract
Using the empirical case of the Iranian nuclear program, the presented text is intended to test and conceptualize the security model of nuclear weapons proliferation, as it was outlined by Scott Sagan. As a byproduct of alternative explanations, the security model offers an implied interpretation rather than a clear conceptualization.
A defensive reaction to a perceived threat from another nation is inherently expected within the security model. The security related but offensive intent is not appropriately covered by the model, though.
Assuming that a defensive purpose requires a present danger from the other nation and the ability of a prospective arsenal to effectively challenge this danger, the two parts of the article's body are respectively devoted to two issues: first, it is examined whether the threat perceived by Iran actually exists, and second, the ability of the arsenal to deter opponents is subsequently addressed within the framework of nuclear strategy.