Strengthening the Role of National Parliaments by the Constitutional Courts of the Central European Member States
Abstract
We can reasonably question the claim of whether the Lisbon Treaty brought about the empowerment of national parliaments to the extent that would weaken the objection regarding a democratic deficit. However, the Treaty clearly brought about the preconditions for a significant change in the relationship between the governments and their national parliaments regarding EU issues, changes that challenge the existing theories on their relationship.
In the future, to grasp these new aspects, the general assessment of the dyadic (government–parliament) or triadic (government– governing party–opposition party) relationship will not suffice. Not only the distinction between the direct or indirect involvement of the national parliaments by the EU Treaties needs to be taken into account, but special attention should also be given to the jurisprudence of the national constitutional courts that focuses on identification of the issues for which the national parliaments must have the final word.
And so, the relevant relationship multiplies to four (government–governing party–opposition party–constitutional court) or even more relevant players, if we consider the role of the national banks and other independent agencies that have become visible in the current financial crisis.