Abstract
In the paper, the author advances the current scientific discussion on the issue of compulsory voting. It is analysed in two ways: philosophical (normative) and instrumental (consequentionalist).
The first level is represented mainly by defence of the civic fundamental rights and freedoms in a democratic society. It is built on the assumption that the introduction of mandatory voting fundamentally erodes aforementioned rights and freedoms.
The second argument is based on the assumption that the widest possible inclusion of citizens in decision-making mechanisms is beneficial to the functioning of democracy and removes, or at least alleviates, some of its inherent weaknesses, such as the lack of government legitimacy, negative election campaigns or the free-riding problem. The author also explains and analyses the most important arguments of both advocates and opponents of the compulsory voting.
Moreover, the author tries to formulate normative conclusions applicable to practice, with particular regard to the current crisis of democratic institutions.