Abstrakt
The following article presents an alternative critical perspective of the cyber security research agenda. The article opens with criticism of the securitization discourse that uses analogies of historical events with events in cyber space.
The author argues that such an approach is inappropriate, and that events of such impact are very unlikely to take place. The events that have already shaped our way of thinking - such as the Estonian attacks - caused significant damage to the respective country; nevertheless, the very same attack today would not do the same harm, thanks to the different level of critical infrastructure in Estonia.
Another example, Stuxnet, is also an event of high impact, but with alow probability of happening in the future. Due to the complexity of the supporting operation of the attack, it would not lead to a cyber world war.
The future will bring more complex, less visible, completely covered and precise operations that will take advantage of all cyber space features, rather than a cybergeddon comparable to some historical event or a nuclear scenario. The author proposes three directions of desired research agenda in the cyber security field.
Firstly, the development of normative framework aimed at a better understanding of cyber events; secondly, a thorough research of cyber space leading to appropriate space conceptualization; and thirdly, the reevaluation of cyber warfare concept in the light of the cyber space novelty.