Post-Enlargement, Post-Lisbon and Post-Crisis European Union and Norm Enforcement: Towards Internal EU Conditionality?
Abstract
Article analyses changes in norm enforcement in the EU triggered by the Eurozone crisis. It tries to demonstrate that the Eurozone crisis contributed to a "transplantation" of conditionality instruments (that traditionally exist within the external EU's relations) into internal operation of the European Union.
In particular, the article identifies which new EU's internal rule-enforcement mechanisms share structural features with the external EU conditionality (vague legal framework, use of expertize of non-EU actors, excess of competencies conferred to the EU, institutional weakening of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Court of Justice, format of sanctions). The article identifies formation of internal EU conditionality within the instruments aimed at crisis management of public finances of the Eurozone states (EFSF, EFSM, ESM) as well as the expansion of new EU conditionality into other areas of the European integration, such as Schengen cooperation and cohesion policy.