Abstract
This article is concerned with the question of how the aesthetic experience of the landscape is important for us. The authors start from J.
M. Howarth's 'Nature's Moods' (1995), that is, from her analysis of the utterances with which we attributed moods or emotional states in general to individual things and processes or to landscapes as whole entities.
In the first and the second part of the article, the two authors go through the possible solutions to the paradoxical nature of these claims, and revise them. In the third and the fourth part, the authors explain them further on the basis of the phenomenological or phenomenologically oriented inquiries of Edmund Husserl, Jan Patočka, David E.
Cooper, and Martin Seel. The chief aim of the article is to identify the particular cognitive values of the qualities to which this type of claim relates and to assess to what extent it is reasonable to call them aesthetic qualities.