Abstrakt
In my submission, I aim to re-introduce realistic general theory of value proposed in R. B.
Perry's book General Theory of Value (1926) and show why it would be worth of an actualized interpretation in contemporary context. Perry famously defines value as "any object of any interest," or, more precisely, claims that "an object - any object - becomes eo ipso valuable whenever an interest - any interest - is taken in it." This would be hardly more than a truism without a precise definition of interest, its objects, and the process of being interested.
Perry developed a singular method of analysis, advancing simultaneously both from the point of close introspection (following in footsteps of William James) and behavioral description (inspired by purposive behaviorism of E. C.
Tolman) and accepting seemingly contradictory insights of these perspectives into a single pluralistic picture of reality. This method helped him to foreshadow descriptions of telic and paratelic motivational states (brought to light by Michael Apter in 1970s), or stress the innate connections between bodily states, affective states, judgments and behavioral patterns (explored to Antonio Damasio in 1990s).
I am going to claim that a general theory of value - a descriptive theory of normative disciplines - could be a way of consilience beteween sciences and humanities, as had been believed by fathers of this discipline in 1910s. Moreveor, I will attempt to show that Perry's theory provides a fruitful methodological framework for such a general theory of value.
Present plurality of approaches to mind (ranging from neuroscience and theory of embodiment, to phenomenology and philosophy of action) would then, naturally, provide material for a more plastic and multi-layered image of value-cognition than Perry could ever hope for.