Abstrakt
Roman Ingarden was one of the closest and most important students of Edmund Husserl from his Göttingen and Freiburg period, to refuse Husserl's transcendental turn. This refusal foreshadowed and latterly shaped central topic of Ingarden's philosophy - the so called idealism-realism problem.
An important part of Ingarden's philosophy including his aesthetics is devoted to giving it a realist solution. In this paper I aim to shed light on the question: Why did Ingarden refuse Husserl's transcendental turn? It is my claim that this refusal was the result of a gradual process which began in 1912, the year of his first acquaintance with phenomenology, and ended in 1918 when he expressed his first critique of Husserl's transcendental idealism.
The inception of his refusal is rooted in the historical circumstances of his acquaintance with Husserl's phenomenology. Ingarden was at the same time influenced by Husserl's phenomenology which was "in the middle of its transcendental turn" as well as by the realist account of phenomenology represented by the Göttingen and the Munich Circle.
Ingarden's early adoption of this realist account, which he followed during the rest of his life, led him to a substantial critical revision of phenomenological or transcendental reduction from the perspective of external perception. This revision revealed the main differences between Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and his own account.
Around 1920, Ingarden considered these differences to be so serious, that he could no longer follow Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.