Abstract
Exploring the case study of Moscow's counterinsurgency in Chechnya, this article shows the crucial importance of cultural knowledge and an ethnographic sense of the patterns of social organization, persisting value systems, and other related phenomena to achieving relative success in eradicating the insurgency in Chechnya. The article uses a range of first-hand sources, including interviews conducted by leading Russian and Chechen experts and investigative journalists, and the testimony of eyewitnesses and key actors in local and Russian politics.
It explains the mechanisms employed by Moscow in its policy of Chechenization, which sought to break the back of local resistance by using local human resources. The study focuses on the crucial period of 2000-04, when Moscow's key proxies in Chechnya, the kadyrovtsy paramilitaries, were established and became operational under the leadership of Akhmad Kadyrov.
The kadyrovtsy helped to create a sharp division within Chechen society, thereby reducing support for the insurgents among the populace and increasing support for pro-Moscow forces.