Abstract
The paper aims to connect empirical legislative power with the theory of its legitimacy. Paper's basic assumption claims that quite common British concept of shared legislative sovereignty is able to produce a certain descriptive outcome if applied to the Czech constitutional system.
Most prominent British models are consequently described and evaluated in order to conclude parallels to Czech constitutional theory. These parallels are discussed in the next chapter.
The attainment of a stable position on the edge between two sovereigns, however, fails to be achieved and represents the most complex issue. Paper argues that Trevor Allan prefers judicial supremacy (with his courts able to invalidate the statute just because of the nature of human rights protection) and that Paul Craig favors the Parliament.
Nevertheless, Paul Craig raises an important aspect - is the so called weak court without the power to strike down Parliament's legislation still weak, when it can declare it to be inhumane? Regarding the Czech theory, the paper drafts a parallel between the conceptions of Pavel Höllander and Trevor Allan, paying them tribute for impressive results, but eventually is being critical to them.