The Hypostatization of Finitude: A Critical Reconstruction of Meillassoux's Argument for the Absoluteness of Contingency
Abstract
This paper reconsiders Meillassoux's argument for a "speculative absolute" or the absoluteness or necessity of contingency, as opposed to the "dogmatic" or "metaphysical" notion of the absolute. Meillassoux tries to establish a positive notion of the absolute, while trying to avoid a relapse into dogmatic metaphysics.
At the same time, he wants to move beyond the prescriptions of critical philosophy, that is, he wants to move from an epistemological towards an ontological stance that promises nothing less than to provide us with the meaning of the notorious "thing in -itself". Naturally, the boldness of the enterprise combined with its ingenuity fascinates many readers.
However, nobody seems to be willing to follow Meillassoux and accept his conclusion, despite his apparently perfectly rational and persuasive argument. The aim of this paper is to provide a new reading of Meillassoux's argument for the necessity of contingency that explains why he fails in his attempt to attain the absolute: the order and nature of his main premises prevent the possibility of establishing a viable notion of the absolute.
Instead, Meillassoux's absolute turns out to be an absolutization of finitude itself. In its spiral movement, the paper follows the circularity of Meillassoux's thought.
This spiral movement should not be confused with any kind of dialectics, however. As his insistence on the integrity of the principle of non -contradiction demonstrates, Meillassoux himself never considered dialectics to be a viable method for his project.
Rather than applying external or normative standards in its analysis and criticism, the paper exposes the problems inherent in Meillassoux's argument from a perspective that follows his very own reasoning.