Abstract
The efficiency/security trade-off hypothesis has become prominent in the field of criminal network analysis, although it has been empirically tested in only a small number of studies. The history of this idea dates back to early 90's with studies pointing out the crucial need for concealment in criminal networks.
This hypothesis states that criminal networks and actors involved in them generally manoeuver between Scylla and Charybdis of immediate profit from its activities (efficiency) and working slowly towards long-term goals while remaining undetected (security). Whether the structure is efficient or secure depends on the goal of the particular network - networks driven by financial profit (e.g., drug traffickers) are supposed to opt for efficiency, while networks driven by ideology (e.g., terrorists) are supposed to opt for secure network structure.
Although network characteristics related closely to this thesis are mainly density and centralization, I argue that in order to properly test the thesis, it is essential to formulate network mechanisms behind security and efficiency. Based on these mechanisms (e.g., closure, brokerage etc.) the exponential random graph model is specified and fitted to a sample of criminal networks of both aforementioned types.
Parameter estimates are subsequently metaanalyzed. In the discussion, I propose to refine the theory by accounting for network dynamics, their environment as well as for other types criminal networks such as gangs or corruption networks.