Abstract
Husserl, as is well known, bases his study of appearing on subjective functions. He also makes appearing prior to being insofar phenomenology grants being to entities only to the point that they can appear.
Both positions result in the paradox that he presents in the Crisis, where he asks: "How can human subjectivity, which is a part of the world, constitute the whole world, i.e., constitute it as its intentional product ...? The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world including itself. What an absurdity!" The paradox arises from Husserl's taking being as presence and asserting that presence is established through constitution and, as such, is the work of subjectivity.
In this article, I explore an alternative based on Aristotle's concept of functioning. This is a functioning that is prior to both subjects and objects, a functioning that is responsible for both being and appearing.
The introduction of this concept, I argue, does not change Husserl's description of the functioning of constitution. It does, however, add an ontological basis that prevents phenomenology from falling into this paradox.