Abstract
The author presents new ways of looking at the acquisition of citizenship by putting the traditional concepts jus soli and jus sanguinis in a different perspective and by calling for further arguments for the preservation of these concepts as the primary criteria for granting citizenship. These considerations are not merely theoretical, without any practical significance.
Firstly, they identify the cases where there is a substantial discrepancy between citizenship and the actual attitude to the state, which may lead to many sad stories in real life and in theory may raise doubts as to the fulfilment of the criterion of inclusion in the democratic process. Furthermore, these considerations raise the issue of whether it can be legitimate to draw a distinction between native and naturalised citizens in terms of access to rights, or in terms of a duty to acquiesce in a sanction or to suffer harm.
The author wonders whether a different path taken to acquire citizenship can lead to a different type of citizenship, or whether such considerations are futile, and it is not permissible to discriminate between citizens who have acquired citizenship based on the manner of acquisition.