Abstract
In discussing the nature of (theoretical) scientific models and the ways in which these models function, several authors have drawn upon an analogy with literary fiction, applying Kendall Walton's theory of pretense. In this talk I will first present various motivations for why one may be inclined to this sort of fictionalism.
Applying the theory of pretense has been helpful in a number of ways. By highlighting the role of scientific imagination in model building, it helps to make sense of pervasive calls for adopting a different attitude than straightforward belief in passages beginning with "let's suppose" and such.
It also helps to make sense of speaking of truth in a model. Moreover, the pretense theory has also been fruitfully applied to account for scientific thought experiments.
Notwithstanding the merits, there are also reasons for caution. For one thing, perhaps the strength of the analogy between models and literature has been overestimated by the proponents of the pretense view of scientific models.
The pretense view in this context might also be problematic because, in focusing overly on what we are supposed to imagine, it may disregard the importance of different ways in which models are actually expressed (which is key in providing scientists with different cognitive access to the studied phenomenon). I will conclude with an assessment of the pretense view of models, suggesting that while it has been instrumental in making of sense of certain aspects of scientific practice we should think twice before fully accepting it.