Abstract
The eleventh chapter shows that, following the enactment of the Civil Code of 2012, a juristic person can no longer be liable under private law in any other form of liability than delegated liability (in Czech: "delegovaná zavázanost"). If we differentiate between responsibility (in Czech: "odpovědnost") for one's own wrong and liability (in Czech: "ručení") (including delegated liability) for wrongs committed by third parties, the author believes that the only conceivable conclusion is that juristic persons are liable based on delegation.
Although the idea of delegated liability draws upon the Anglo-American concept of vicarious liability, the author arrives at this notion using his own path, via a historical analysis of the development of notions of responsibility and suretyship (later denoted by the author as "liability") in Czech law. Thanks to adaptation of former Czech legal terminology and thanks to adoption of the author's own theory of responsibility (liability), it is thus possible to conclude that juristic persons cannot be individually responsible or directly liable for their own acts.
They can only be liable based on delegation, for wrongs of other persons who must ultimately be human beings. A clear advantage of this approach lies, according to the author, in a clear distinction of responsibility (liability) of juristic persons from that of natural persons-human beings.
This is why, in respect of juristic persons, the author considers the notion of "responsibility" ("odpovědnost") misleading and suggests that it be replaced by the concept of "liability" ("zavázanost"), or delegated liability. The similarity of this notion with the Anglo-American concept of vicarious liability then indicates a need for a further comparative research in this field.