Abstrakt
From its earliest formulations, Eugen Fink's meontic philosophy seeks to render questionable the problem of a positive discourse about what is not directly presented and given in our experience as something perceptible to our senses. Besides resorting to the Kantian definition of the 'transcendental dialectic' to think the non-given, Fink also devotes himself to the question of the negative and of the whole metaphysical spectrum necessarily involved in determining the me-on, that is, something beyond a mere negative negativity or the bare nothingness, something that we can think of as the denial of a fixed and permanent identity that prevents the creation and any manifestation of the 'inherent' other in every 'same'.
The meontic (me-on, non-entity) philosophy, therefore, plunges into the arid terrain of questions such as 'absolute' and 'origin' to rethink the presuppositions of Husserlian phenomenology and, among them, the problem of the world. The present contribution aims to present the figures of 'distance' and 'absence' as the guiding lines of an interpretative proposal concerning the figure of the negative in the two volumes of study-notes recently published in Fink's Complete Works (Phänomenologische Werkstatt I and II).