Abstract
The aim of the third chapter is to explain what constitutes the capacity of a juristic person to engage in "legal conduct" (perform legal acts), on the one hand, and to bear legal responsibility (liability), on the other hand. The author concludes that, for a juristic person to be able to engage in legal conduct and bear legal responsibility (liability), it must be imputed with reason and will.
Considering that reason and will are imputed to a human being, who is simultaneously always also a natural person, the reason and will of a juristic person are in fact necessarily "someone else's" reason and will. From this perspective, "lawful " or "unlawful" conduct of a juristic person cannot be considered to be that person's own, genuine conduct; however, this in no way prevents imputing someone else's reason and will to a specific juristic person, thus causing the legal consequences foreseen by the legislation both for legal conduct and for legal responsibility.