Abstract
This paper focuses on the concept of freedom developed by the Hungarian-German philosopher László Tengelyi. Freedom as one of the categories of the experience is a fundamental part of the project of a phenomenological metaphysics, which Tengelyi establishes in his 2014 study World and Infinity.
Phenomenological metaphysics cannot be defined by the onto-theological structure of metaphysics and the explication of the concept of freedom demonstrates this non-traditional variant of metaphysics. Because of this, freedom is characterrized as partial causality and does not correspond to Kant's concept of parallel freedom as spontaneity.
Furthermore, in his phenomenological project of a metaphysical revival, Tengelyi sees in Heidegger's transcendental concept of freedom a basis for the opposition between the parallel and the partial nature of freedom. Transcendental freedom as the ground of the ground belongs to the short but vivid metontological period of Heidegger's thinking (1928-1930), for which it is of substantial importance.