This paper analyses the implication of subsidizes, reinforcement of capacity for work, and sanctions under Employment Acts to enable young third-country immigrant's transition to work in Austria, Finland and Czech Republic. Existing research pointed economic crisis and immense fiscal burden with unemployment have prompted government to check the rise of direct public expenditure and foster an increased sense of fairness in how public funds are spent to get vulnerable working age population off benefits.
It takes place through a modernized social protection welfare system with activation measures and services, underpinned by a market-based model of membership that assumes individual responsibilities and autonomy. Access to benefits are tightened and linked to work-related incentives in terms of subsidizes, reinforce work capacity, and sanctions to help unemployed searching for work, take up available work, and enter into work.
On the one hand, targeting eligibility through work-related incentives allocate benefits to the most needy and deserving that involves people in the mainstream of community life through deinstitutionalization to improve job seekers' opportunities. On the other hand, this policy measures do not always comport with their intentions and public subsidized works may morph into contrived jobs with little value and undermine morale.
That characterized the strategic allocation of social benefits as an assault on human dignity with indication of policymakers' tactful game to take benefits away from people that show they may loathe in performance and prefer not to admit. Based on qualitative document analysis and an overview of scholarly texts, this paper concludes a convergence of the selected entities towards behavioral targeting regulatory governance devices that administer young third-country immigrants' transition to work process.
Notwithstanding, Czech Republic is dissimilar to Austria and Finland with its "universal liberalism" policy approach that focus on investment incentive governance to subsidizes employers/investors to create jobs and incentive job-seekers to easily create jobs and get Labour Office contribution in the form of "flat-rate benefits for all" with less state intervention. Whereas Finland and Austria prefer to grant employers subsidies when they employ multiple disadvantaged job seekers and subsidizes young job seekers' mobility cost to reduce tangible barriers and incentive them take jobs far from their vicinity.
The outcome pointed to a move toward the re-commodification of labour in time of austerity policy reforms. This is relevant because it reflects a pivotal shift in the conventional welfare-state discourse based on a social-democratic model and universal rights to an enabling state selective targeting principle in the allocation of scarce resources that may undermine vulnerable people's participation and penalize belongings with social cohesion