Abstract
Starting from Husserl's late text concerning the status of philosophy within history, we want to shed light on the immanent genesis of sense detected in history of philosophy. Husserl argues that philosophy in its original state involves an essential kind of naivety, i.e., the blindness regarding the lifeworld active in every theoretical act.
This peculiar blindness leads to self-interpretation of philosophy as a science of the universe of what is. But this self-interpretation cannot hold and as a consequence, philosophy found itself in danger.
I am keen to argue, that Husserl's well-known dictum "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science - the dream is over." does not express his own position concerning philosophy, but particular historical self-interpretation of philosophy. Husserl puts this sense between brackets in order to inquire its essence.
From this historical reflection he gains the new way of interpreting philosophy, i.e., philosophy as kind of 'poeticizing' (Dichtung). A remarkable moment in the development of phenomenology after Husserl is the gradual shift from the preference of seeing to the emphasis on listening.
Although this happens only with Jean-Luc Nancy, the development is somehow implied already in Husserl's concept of hyletic data and its development in Maldiney and Lévinas. The next article deals with the return to the ancient understanding of sensuality, especially of touch, and shows how phenomenology follows this tradition.
In this way, the authors after Husserl correct his conception of intentionality and save the autonomy of the sphere that precedes the noetic-noematical relationship. If, formerly, one read Heidegger's 1927 Sein und Zeit or else, following his self-nominated 'turning,' one read the more aesthetic, poetic writings, sometimes called the 'later Heidegger,' the publication of the Beiträge in 1989 set a new pattern for Heidegger scholarship.
I review the question of the author's 'authorized' edition, Ausgabe letzter Hand, including the roles played by editors and not less the effects of varying translations before turning to a discussion of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche in the Beiträge, a reflection on the clearing of refusal as the silent withdrawal of the last god. As contrastive conclusion, I offer a comparative reading of Nietzsche's 'unknown god.' The next paper addresses the question of Heidegger's (relation to) phenomenology in his later philosophy along the guiding thread of the difference between being (beyng) and beings, marking various ways in which his thinking moves at the limit of phenomenology.
The first part considers the relation between the project of Being and Time and the poietic thinking of Contributions with respect to phenomenology in order to problematize the notion that once Heidegger abandons the project of Being and Time he also abandons phenomenology in favor of thinking the being in its historicality as event. The second part considers how Heidegger thinks beyond phenomena in his thought of the beingless and expropriation (Enteignis), relating this to his notion of a phenomenology of the inapparent (Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren).
The last section addresses Heidegger's task of allowing beings to be "more being" (seiender), arguing that in his thinking of the fourfold what is at stake is not so much the appearing of the thing but rather the event gathered through it.