Abstract
The article deals with the phenomenon of online platform "self-preferencing" - a situation when an online platform provides more favourable conditions for its own activities on the platform related to the offering of goods or services in comparison with its competitors present on the platform. This phenomenon is described from the viewpoint of competition law and the new regulation dealing with online intermediation services and internet search engines.
This work strives to clarify what can be already derived from currently applicable law and to discuss possible future development of regulation and competition law practice. The discussed regulation specifically aiming at online platforms does not allow for many substantive conclusion on the topic.
The recent competition law case law also does not give many clear hints how to treat self-preferencing activities of online platforms, which at least can be viewed as problematic. In absence of clear sector-specific regulation dealing with substance, it will remain the task of competition authorities to set more complicated remedies ordering concrete action of the undertaking instead of a simple prohibition.
Crucially, such remedies present a stronger restriction of the rights of its addressees and, moreover, are harder to formulate in a way that allows them to contribute to their pro-competitive goal. The author of this article believes that competition law does not necessarily have to be the best suited tool used to resolve some of the more general questions concerning online platform self-preferencing.
Instead, a case for substantive sector-specific regulation is made. This does not mean that competition authorities should ignore online platforms altogether.
First, there are much clearer areas of competition law which equally apply to online platforms just as much as to any other undertaking. Second, competition law would certainly play a vital role even in a future situation with duties clearly established in a regulatory framework.