Abstract
The aim of the paper is to offer an account of the controversy concerning the issue of the determination of the will in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. After setting the issue in the context, i.e. as a device to decide on a non-circular grounds the pivotal question of the adequate interpretation of the Principle of sufficient reason, I analyse the subsequent stages of the discussion in order to offer a precise statement of the real crux of the debate, viz. the question of whether intra-mental motives are causally in operation in the determination of the will to volitions.
Finally, I trace the reasons that probably stand behind the opposing standpoints of both correspondents concerning this last question. In particular, I argue that once the intra-mental motives in question are interpreted - plausibly, given the context of the debate - as judgments concerning propositionally-structured normative content, the nature of Clarke ʼs repeated charges against Leibniz in terms of fatalism and blind necessity comes out distinctly, as well as the answer to the question why Leibniz decides to respond to these charges in the ways he does.