Abstract
The paper is based on the premise that courts, especially supreme and higher courts, can by their procedure and choice of argumentation significantly influence the applicability of their rulings in future similar cases. Thus, for example, courts may broaden or narrow down the applicability of a general rule, or reinterpret it, or avoid completely deciding certain issues.
In this paper, I will deal mainly with one of the forms of judicial self-restraint and the aim will be to assess to what extent the self-restraint of courts and their minimalist decision-making fulfils the basic role of the judicial power, i.e. to provide the protection of rights. To this end, I will mention in the introduction a few cases decided by the Czech Constitutional Court, where I will present examples of minimalist and maximalist judicial decisions.
Subsequently, I will try to point out the tendencies of the current judicial protection of fundamental rights and conclude with a brief evaluation of how minimalism or maximalism in decision-making in connection with activism or passivism in judicial decision-making constitutes strengthening or weakening of fundamental rights protection.
