Abstrakt
The nuclear world order, and more specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), represent since their very creation objects of contestation. This chapter argues that it is the institutionalized power inequality between state parties that creates conflict among them over the distribution of security, economic, and developmental benefits.
In that respect, states with growing economic importance and heightened security interests are most likely to contest the status quo, but not necessarily the BRICS states as these are not bound by a common interest or agenda within the regime. To analyse the contestation of the NPT, the chapter adopts a mixed method approach.
Through a qualitative content analysis of states' statements at major institutional gatherings, the chapter identifies four central conflict lines and actors' preferences regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Linear regression analysis is used to assess the relative influence of different actors groups on the intensity and type of contestation.
Results show that the majority of state parties actively and constructively engages with the institution by pushing for institutional reform, recognizing in principle the legitimacy of the institution. Voicing criticism and exposing weaknesses of the institution was the least frequent form of contestation.