Abstrakt
What appears to be Russia's recent series of successes in the Middle East has been considered by many commentators as a sign of its rising power in one of the world's key regions. Indeed, alongside Iran, Russia has helped its key ally, the Bashar al-Assad regime, which had been at the brink of collapse in 2015, to regain control over much of Syria.
Moscow has also provided support to General Khalifa Haftar to make significant advances against his opponents in the Libyan civil war. This article questions these widespread assumptions.
It makes the point that these successes have been rather minor and are likely to be short-lived in the face of the challenges both Arab republics face. In spite of tactical gains, Moscow has trapped itself in the messy politics of civil-war-torn nations with a host of economic, political and social problems.
Should Moscow benefit from its presence in these nations, it has to engage substantially in the costly postwar reconstruction, international support and - particularly in the case of Syria - convoluted entanglement of the often-contradictory interests of regional powers. This article claims that, while Russia has little to gain from engagement in these challenging tasks, it is likely to be dragged into them.