Abstract
Rebel groups engage in a series of economic transactions with their local populations during a civil war. These interactions resemble those of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort the local economic actors to fund their fighting activities and control the territory.
Seeking security in this unstable political environment, these economic actors may decide to flee or to pay the rebels in order to ensure their own protection, impacting the outcomes of the civil war. We present a simulation model (executable at https://gnardin.github.io/RebelGroups) that attempts to capture the decision-making and behavior of the involved actors during protection racket interactions as well as the cooperation and competition between rebel groups to control territory.
Our model reveals insights about the mechanisms that are helpful for understanding violence outcomes in civil wars, and the conditions that may lead rebel groups to prevail. Analysis of various scenarios demonstrates the impact that different security factors play on civil war dynamics.
Using Somalia as a case study, we also assess the importance of the rebel groups' economic bases of support in a real-world setting.