Abstract
In the conception of modern bioethics, the concept of autonomy plays a dominant role. Contemporary bioethical discourse in many cases glorifies an approach founded on this principle, and it seems that its role in moral conduct in applied bioethics is considered to be the key to salvation.
This article attempts, to a certain extent, to relativise the dominant principle of autonomy, especially in medical ethics, even if it does not deny its indispensability. It points, however, to particular practical aspects which respect for the principle of autonomy, especially in the doctor-patient relation, can influence in a negative way, or can quite negate.
As the basic antithesis to theories which found their priority on the axiom of respect to autonomy, the author then presents paternalistic and neo-paternalistic concepts in bioethics which find support, above all, in the principle of beneficence. The argument in this article necessarily demands an outline of the basic properties of paternalism and autonomy.
For this reason the article especially focuses on models of the relationships between doctor and patient, that is on medical ethics in the narrow sense.