Abstract
The phenomenological discussion on intersubjectivity, lasting for over a century, can be retrospectively structured along several lines. One of them is the distinction between the theories of intersubjectivity based on experiences oriented towards individual others and the theories based on being-with others (on co-existence).
While the former theories (Husserl, Scheler, Stein, Levinas, Sartre) claim that intersubjectivity (in a more restricted I-thou meaning) is a precondition of sociality, the latter (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) affirm the opposite: our concrete encounters are possible only because we already live in a shared (social) world, which implies that we understand another not primarily as a concrete "thou", but as "anyone". The exposition in this entry takes this distinction as its guiding line.
As we show in the concluding part, this distinction does not exhaust possible modalities of the relation of I and the Other. A concept of renewed importance, the group or plural subject, enters the discussion, casting new light on classic phenomenologists and opening new perspectives on intersubjectivity.