Abstract
The starting point for fi nding an optimal relationship between fundamental rights and public interests is the theory of the value coherence of the constitution, which implies that constitutional values constitute a certain fundamental and internal structure of law that corresponds to the public interest at the most general level. Whether an individual or normative act corresponds to a public interest cannot be ascertained by comparing it with an abstract established (or discovered) a priori public interest.
On the contrary, in the public interest, there are acts that reflect interests common to all people. This fact leads to two conclusions: on the one hand, the public interest in constitutional law is not just the sum of individual interests, as it contains an additional quality.
Secondly, the public interest is a dynamic concept which, like law, is exercised in a certain social reality and is therefore a term with variable meaning. These characteristics of the conception of public interest in constitutional law have a practical eff ect on the way in which fundamental rights and public interests are balanced.