Abstract
The text is inspired by the article of Steve Fuller named Making Agency Count (Fuller 1994) where Fuller introduced the concept of agency in medias res in order to treat agency as a kind of social "scarce good". My aim is to show that while Fuller claim seems plausible in the light of the agency negotiation in the legal determintion of patents, the fetal medicine or the fetal fissue research, there are nevertheless several problems in its implications.
First, if we consider moral action as an example of agency, an altruistic actor, in order to not consume much form the stock of available agency, would resign from a moral action, or, in extreme case, would act immorally to provide more space for moral actioon. Second, agency is always connected to multiple meanings therfore what is considered as agency by one actor, could be consideršed as non-agency by another one.
Agency can by multiplied by diversification of attributed meanings, what is not the case of economic goods. In concluding the article I make a hypothesis that there is an interesting kind of agency (quasi-agency), which is produced by a social protection.
Childre, animals, fetuses are claimed to be actors but, in fact, this magnify temporarily mainly the agency of claimants than tose objects of protection.