Abstract
Distribution of decisional power among member states of the EU has remained a hot issue in recent discussions about future design of European Union decision making and revision of unsuccessful proposal of Constitutional Treaty. Usually only the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers under qualified majority voting rule is taken into account.
In contrast to that, in this paper we formulate simplified models of consultation and co-decision procedures in decision-making of the European Union institutions, reflecting fact that together with Council of Ministers also Commission and European Parliament are important actors in the EU decision making. The main conclusion of the paper is that distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers voting is a bad proxy of national influence in European Union decision making.
With rare exceptions decision making is based on consultation and co-decision procedures involving Commission and/or European Parliament. Legislative procedures changes inter-institutional distribution of power (among Council, Commission and European Parliament), reducing the power of the Council, and at the same time they change intra-institutional power in the Council (relative power of the member states compared to the Council voting without taking into account Commission and Parliament).