Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explain why interpretation of the law cannot be understood as mere intellectual cognition of the meaning of the text being interpreted. Indeed, interpretation of a legal text yields a duty enforceable by the law.
This paper therefore first deals with the question of what interpretation of the law has in common with interpretation in general and in what ways it differs. A specific aspect of interpreting the law lies especially in the purpose of interpretation, i.e. setting a specific duty for an individual entity.
Interpretation of the law can thus be conceived as a process aimed to ensure that what is laid down in general terms is in conformity with what is eventually applied specifically in an individual case. Interpretation, as transformation of a general and (usually also) abstractly formulated duty into an individualised specific duty, thus includes two distinct competences: (i) the competence to specify (concretise) a legal norm; and (ii) the competence to individualise a legal norm.
However, interpretation is usually only equated to "concretisation" of decisions, which relates to the abstract nature of the general norm under which the given situation is subsumed. This chapter shows, nonetheless, that the law is already being interpreted in the process of choosing the correct norm from among possible alternatives.
Teleological considerations are thus already made at the stage of individualisation with a view to determining which norm will be the most appropriate for assessing the given legal case.