Abstract
This paper aims to introduce the concept and limits of criminal sanctions against freedom of expression. It also wants to point out the very thin line between freedom of expression and possible conduct that crosses this line.
It is for this reason that the approach to sanctioning such speech should be as restrictive as possible. In the words of the Constitutional Court, "the unquestioned guarantee of fundamental rights (including freedom of expression) for everyone is both a right and a duty of a democratic state ... [it] cannot, however, be confused with a resignation to confront manifestations of evil and hatred even by means which may appear harsh to the propagators of such manifestations." It is necessary to balance freedom of expression as a fundamental human right on the one hand, and the principles of humanism on which our society is based on the other.
All of the above is relevant to the current conflict in Ukraine. The concept of so-called hate speech and hate crimes is described, as well as constitutional, international and statutory legislation.
The main focus is on the sanctioning of speech in relation to the Ukrainian conflict and the approach of law enforcement authorities to it (Opinion of the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, Case No. 1 SL 117/2022). The chronological development of the whole situation is described here, and in particular the issue of individual facts under which the approval of Russian aggression can be subsumed.
These are the offence of approval of a crime under section 365 of the Criminal Code and the offence of denying, questioning, approving and justifying genocide under section 405 of the Criminal Code.