Freedom as Not-Thinkable-Beforehand: An Analysis of the Freedom Essay of 1809 based on Heidegger's Lectures of 1936
Abstrakt
In this paper we present the grounding of a dispositional theory of freedom in Schelling around 1809 and 1810 by mobilizing Heidegger's 1936 commentary of the Freedom Essay (2). We see the constitution of freedom in Schelling as a fusion of idealist theories of freedom and the theory of nature as life, becoming, and productivity (3).
Heidegger's thought regarding Schelling's concept of freedom is mobilized in the following points (2). The first concerns the determination of freedom in general through the ((essence}} of human freedom.
Both authors establish, secondly, the paradoxical character of human freedom as ideal indeterminacy, and, at the same time, as an ((always-already-decided}} being. The division of the ((essence}} of every being between ground and existence is already a famous locus of coincidence between Schelling's and Heidegger's ontological thought.
The way in which this division is articulated regarding the concept of temporal determination will be the subject of our analysis in sections 2 and 4.