Proportionality, Integration Effect, and Legitimacy of the Electoral System to the Czech Chamber of Representatives: A Simulation study of the impacts of D'Hondt divisor, Imperiali Quota and Hare Quota
Abstract
Although the change in the electoral system used in elections to the Chamber of Deputies has attracted the attention of lawyers, political scientists, and sociologists, we still lack a comprehensive comparative analysis of the new system with the original one or other alternatives. The main reason for this is the lack of empirical data.
This article overcomes this problem using a simulation of electoral results that correspond to the real Czech election environment. On the basis of this simulated dataset it is possible to generate generalisable conclusions about the proportionality, integration effect, and legitimacy of three electoral formulas: the original D'Hondt divisor, the newly adopted Imperiali quota, and the Hare quota.
Our results show that the Hare quota is clearly the best choice. Its advantages in proportionality significantly outweigh its disadvantages in integrative effect.
Moreover, this formula sees the least disruption to the logical sequence of results, i.e. where a party with fewer votes gets more seats, a phenomenon that is undesirable and undermines the legitimacy of elections. We are convinced that among the three formulas compared the Hare quota is the one that best fits the constitutional requirements of the electoral system as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, and that - unless the legislature is planning to change other parameters of the electoral system - it is the one that should be implemented.