Abstract
In the "Preussen contra Reich" case of 1932, Carl Schmitt's theories on equal chance and law in extreme conditions are interpreted and applied in a court of law, firstly by Schmitt himself, then, going contrary to Schmitt's interpretation, by Dr. Arnold Brecht and Dr.
Hans Peters. This paper will first present the basis of the two theories from Schmitt's "Legality and Legitimacy," namely, equal chance and the need for extraordinary measures.
Then this paper will focus on the diverging legal interpretations of these two theories, as presented in court by different legal theorists. These divergent interpretations of "equal chance" and "law in extreme conditions," as presented in the aforementioned case, have yet to reach an international readership, as the case itself has never been fully translated into English.
Finally, this paper will question the practical application of the two theories in the reality of the empirical world, which in turn question the relationship between any parliamentary legislative system and law. In doing so, the question of how the rule of law should be applied and understood within a liberal democracy is tackled.