Abstract
This publication provides a comprehensive analysis of the issue of supreme command over the armed forces from a constitutional and legal perspective. The political science section delves into the object, subjects, content, and scope of supreme command as the exercise of the highest decision-making authority over the armed forces. Special attention is devoted to the analysis of the nature of the armed forces as a distinct organization and the constitutional-theoretical context of supreme command. Additionally, it highlights the impact of supreme command on the structure of presidential and semi-presidential regimes.
The subsequent section focuses on a comparative analysis of the constitutional anchoring of supreme command in Germany, Austria, Poland, and Slovakia. This is followed by an examination of the historical constitutional regulation of supreme command in the Czech lands, with a particular focus on the period of the First Republic.
The constitutional law section dissects the position of the President of the Republic as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces pursuant to Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. The author critiques existing interpretations and offers an original perspective on the interpretation and understanding of the President's Commander-in-Chief powers within the constitutional framework. The text also addresses the issue of countersignature and the legal nature of acts by the supreme commander, as well as the constitutional concept of the armed forces.