The discrepancy between the constitutionally defined and actual exercise of the power of state institutions has been widely discussed within European political science. The adop- tion of direct presidential elections in the Czech Republic, where the law entered into force in 2012, and the associated shift towards a more powerful presidency has also prompted much debate. The sovereign perception of the mandate of the first directly elected president,
Miloš Zeman, intensified academic discussions about the implications of a change in regime type (from a parliamentary one towards a de facto semi-presidential one). While scholars have differing views on this matter, only a few academic articles have focused on the cru- cial aspects of presidential power, with most rather assessing the overall regime character instead. This paper views the appointment of cabinet members as an essential non-shared presidential power, emphasizing interactions among actors in the political system. A com- parative case study enables us to explore situations where three Czech presidents adopted authoritative approaches in exercising their powers. We present a new dataset that uses qualitative analysis to examine incidences when a president delayed the process of appointing cabinet members, representing a deviation from the praxis of cabinet domination in a parliamentary regime. Comparing the three Czech presidents - two elected indirectly and one directly elected - enables us to assess the impact of the popular vote in this regard.
Focusing on a temporal dimension allows for comparison of the periods of delay between a publicly declared effort to reject candidates till the moment of their appointments (or withdrawal). The key findings consist of the significant difference between indirectly elected presidents and their directly elected counterparts in appointing cabinet members. The paper contributes to the debate about the discrepancy between constitutionally defined powers, their exercising in reality, and a shift from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism.