Abstract
In my article, I would like to discuss the Constitutional Court's approach to social rights, the search for their limits and, on the contrary, for their untouchable core, i.e., their essence and meaning, as provided for in Article 4(4) of the Charter. Social rights, i.e. those regulated by the Charter in Title IV, are subject to the regime of Article 41(1) of the Charter and can therefore be invoked only within the limits of the laws implementing them. The specific implementation of these rights is thus entrusted to the legislator, who may not, in the words of the Constitutional Court in its judgment Pl. ÚS 2/08.
In this and other rulings, the Constitutional Court explains its restrained position with two main arguments. According to the Constitutional Court, it also depends on the relationship between the state and the citizen and the conflict between the principles of merit and solidarity. Second, in its rulings, the Constitutional Court classifies the decision on the scope of social rights as an important political issue that is subject to political competition. They are subject to discussion and public debate, which is one of the reasons why the Constitutional Court is more restrained in its decisions towards the legislator.
On the other hand, however, the Constitutional Court refers to the German Federal Constitutional Court, which derives limits to the legislator's interpretation of the minimum of social rights from the fundamental principle of human dignity. In my contribution, I would therefore like to discuss those cases where the Constitutional Court has dealt with a breach of the limits of this minimum level of social rights or, conversely, where it has found the level of solidarity and the associated redistribution to be excessive. I would also like to discuss how the Constitutional Court perceives what belongs to the irreducible minimum it protects, how this minimum is evolving and how the German constitutional case law, which has a strong influence on us, is approaching the situation.