I. Fundamentals of Law and Economics. Externalities and the Coase theorem

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 1, 2, 4

Posner, Richard: Economic Analysis of the Law (5th ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers, 1998 pp. 3-31.

Montag, J. and Sobek, T. (2018): Proportionality test, forthcoming in Marciano, A. and Ramello G.B. (Eds.). 2019. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126389

Coase, Ronald H., The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (1960).

Calabresi, G., & Melamed, A. D. (1972). Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral. Harvard law review, 1089-1128.

II. The Economics of Property Rights

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 4, 5

Friedman, David: Defining and Enforcing Rights: Property, Liability, & Spaghetti, in Law’s Order: What Economics Has to do with Law and Why It Matters, 2003, chapter 5.

III. The Economics of Torts-Fundamentals and Liability

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 6, 7

IV. An Economic Theory of Contract I.- Fundamentals, Efficient Breach

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 8, 9

V. An Economic Theory of Contract II.- Asymmetric Information, Risk Allocation

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 8, 9

Akerlof, George A.,The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488.

Ben-Shahar, O., & Schneider, C. E. (2014). More than you wanted to know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure. Princeton University Press, Introduction.

VI. Economics of Crime and Punishment

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 11, 12

Becker, Gary: Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, 1968, pp. 167-217 (March/April).

Brabenec, T., & Montag, J. (2014). Criminals and the Price System: Evidence from Czech Metal Thieves. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1-34.

VII. Economics of Civil and Criminal Procedure

Cooter and Ulen: chapter 10

Garoupa, N. (2012). The economics of prosecutors. Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, 231.

Garoupa, N., & Stephen, F. H. (2008). Why plea-bargaining fails to achieve results in so many criminal justice systems: A new framework for assessment. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 15(3), 323-358.

Dusek, L. and Montag, J. (2019) The effects of simplified criminal procedure: Evidence from one million Czech cases. Working paper, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629116

VIII. Legal Origins, Institutions, and Economic Growth

Shleifer A., R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes (2008). The economic consequences of legal origins, J of Economic Literature.

Djankov S., A. Shleifer, R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes (2003). Courts, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Djankov S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh, A. Shleifer (2008). Debt Enforcement Around the World, J of Political Economy.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. A. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In Philippe Aghion and Stephen N. Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook of economic growth: volume 1A, 2005, (pp. 386–464). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Feld, L.P. & Voigt, S. (2003) Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527.